mind may be viewed as a reasoned ontological conversion.
With the growing current interest in ontologies that posit entities that do not really exist, Ockham's reasons for first adopting and then rejecting the objective-existence theory merit closer philosophical analysis than they have received.6 In what follows, I shall begin by considering Ockham's arguments in favor of the objective-existence theory. His reasons for changing his mind-of which we shall examine four-represent a surprising mixture of insight and confusion. In the end, I think it will appear that Ockham weighed the disadvantages of the objectiveexistence theory more carefully than the consequences of the mental-act theory and in fact had better reason to abandon the former than to adopt the latter. 
I. The Distinction Between Objective and Real Existence
Ockham's arguments for distinguishing a kind of existence distinct from real existence rest on the observation that we are able to think of three kinds of things that do not and/or cannot really exist: ( Ockham assumes that whatever is thought of must have some sort of ontological status. When we think of something that really exists, its ontological status is straight-forward. What about when we think of things that do not and/or cannot really exist? Ockham insists that even these must be something that is not nothing. Otherwise, we would be thinking of nothing. 12 " Thus in Com. to Peri., ch. 1 F, p. 323, Ockham begins an argument against the mental-act theory in favor of the objective-existence theory as follows: "First, take the common or confused cognition that corresponds to the spoken word 'man' or 'animal'. I ask whether something is understood by this cognition or nothing. It cannot be said that nothing is. For just as it is impossible that there should be a vision and nothing be seen, or that there should be a desire and nothing desired, so also it is impossible that there should be a cognition and nothing be cognized by that cognition . . ." Cf. Ord. I, d.2, q.8; OT II, p. 268. that such unreal objects of thought have "objective,"13 "intensional," or "cognized" existence' as opposed to "subjective" or real existence.15
Ockham's reasoning could thus be formulated as follows.
We think of objects of sorts (a)-(c).
2. If we think of something, it has some sort of existencethat is to say either objective or real existence. Once one has arrived at such an analysis for these cases, it is natural to extend it to thoughts about real things, so that really existent things also have objective existence when they are thought of. Ockham does not explicitly make this move in the passages where he is arguing for the distinction between objective and real existence. But there is some textual evidence that he took such an extension for granted when he first commented on the Sentences. 16 Contemporary philosophers may be struck by the similarity between Ockham's views and those generally ascribed to Alexius Meinong. They would be even more similar if Ockham had said that what has objective existence has it independently of whether it is ever thought of. In fact, he says the opposite. He claims that things that have "only objective existence" are such that "their to be is to be known or cognized."'7 Thus, "x has objective existence" entails "Someone is thinking of x" or "An act of thinking of x really exists." This does not necessarily mean that the objective existence of things is interrupted, however. For Ockham seems to imply that everything-actual, possible, or impossiblehas objective existence eternally and immutably in the mind of God. 18 Conclusions (4) and (6) distinguish two elements involved in our thought of nonexistents: really existent acts or qualities of mind, and objects that have objective existence (in Meinong's terminology, subsist or have Aussersein). Presumably, there is also a rela- 16 The clearest indication comes in his discussion of divine ideas, where he implies that creatures have objective existence in God's mind even when they are real. For he says that the "ideas" of all creatures are "eternally and immutably understood by God." (Ord. I, d.35, q.5 K) And he has previously identified divine ideas with the creatures themselves insofar as they are in the divine mind objectively (ibid. G). It seems to follow that all creatures have objective existence in the divine mind eternally and immutably, even though some of them are real at times. And since there is no theoretical reason why God's awareness should differ from creatures' in this respect, this is some reason to think that Ockham's objective-existence theory applied to all thoughts. Further evidence comes in Ockham's reference to an intuitive cognition of a particular. Unlike the early Russell, Ockham never thought that particulars-other than conventional signs and (on the mental-act theory) mental qualities-could, insofar as they existed in reality, be terms in a proposition. If when he held the objective-existence theory, he thought that particulars such as Socrates, this whiteness, or this body, could be the terms of propositions, it must have been because he supposed them to have objective existence. And since intuitive cognitions cannot be produced naturally unless the object really exists, he must have thought that the objects of such cognitions have objective existence even when they really exist. It would be purely contingent that such relations held at all and held between a given object and a particular mental act. Unwilling to accept this consequence, Meinong supposes that there is some real feature of an act of thought that necessarily directs it to its object. He calls such real features "contents." Does Ockham posit anything analogous to Meinong's contents? There is some hint that when he first held the objective-existence theory, he believed that the similarity of a mental act to a thing is in part what directs the act towards one object rather than another. In Reportatio II, q. 15 EE, Ockham considers an objection based on the postulate of Greek epistemology that "all knowledge is by assimilation." From the observation that every mental act of cognition is equally similar to a number of distinct particulars, the conclusion is drawn that we never have a cognition that is proper to one particular alone. Ockham replies that the similarity of an act to the thing will not suffice by itself; one must add that the act is caused or apt to be caused by one of the particulars and not the others. 21 In taking the objection to be relevant and replying as he does, Ockham thus implies that a mental act's similarity to a thing, and actual or possible causal connection with it, is what directs it towards one object rather than another. For the objective-existence theory, a cognition will be proper to one particular alone provided it is directed towards that particular in objective existence and that particular alone. Any observation about how similar the mental act is or is not to a particular would seem irrelevant, unless such similarity were thought to play a role in directing the act towards one object rather than another.
In Further, such afictum hinders the cognition of a thing. Therefore,ficta should not be posited to explain cognition. Proof of the premise: The fictum is neither the cognition nor the whiteness nor both together, but some third thing that is a mean between the cognition and the thing. Therefore, if the fictum is understood, the mind-independent thing is not understood ... 4. Mind-independent things are never the immediate objects of our awareness, which is clearly a denial of direct realism in epistemology I shall return to (2) later. The appropriate response to (1) anc (3) depends upon how the word 'fictum" is understood. If it is being used here the way it was used by Ockham when he first formulated the objective-existence theory, then it stands only for those objectively existent entities that cannot exist in reality. On this interpretation, (3) is clearly true, but (1) is false on the objectiveexistence theory. For as long as he was an adherent of the objective-existence theory, Ockham would have held that ficta are the immediate objects of thought and awareness in some cases only: that is to say, when we think (a) of things having incompatible properties or (b) of abstract objects such as universals, but not when we think (c) of things that can really exist but in fact do not. He explicitly notes that where our thoughts of universals are concerned, theseficta do come between us and really existent particulars naturally signified by them. But, as he recognized, this fact presents no challenge to his version of direct realism in epistemology. For the latter theory claims only that we are sometimes-namely, in intuitive cognition and the abstractive cognition that immediately follows it-immediately aware of particulars, not that we always are. And according to the objectiveexistence theory, nofictum is the immediate object of thought in intuitive cognition. Rather the objectively existent particular it-self, which is identical with the really existent particular is. 21 On the other hand, if "fictum" is used for any putative entities in a nonreal mode of existence, Ockham's objective-existence theory is committed to (1), but not to (3). For the objectively existent entities that are the immediate objects of our awareness in intuitive cognitions, are the particulars themselves. Either way, Ockham's objective-existence theory does not maintain both (1) and (3), and the objection seems to fail because of a false premise.
Ockham was not the first philosopher to hold that particulars as well as uni-
Ockham's general arguments against Aureoli's similar theory include a different version of this reasoning. Focusing on a veridical visual awareness of whiteness, Ockham argues first that the whiteness and its apparent existence (Aureoli's analogue of objective existence) are not really the same.
I ask about the apparent existence in which the whiteness is constituted when the whiteness appears. Either it is really the same as the whiteness, or it is not really the same. If it is said that it is really the same-on the contrary, when some things are really the same, they are simultaneously generated and corrupted, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, Book IV. Consequently, whenever some things are really the same, it is impossible that one should exist while the other does not. But this (where the whiteness is indicated) cannot be that (where that apparent existence, which does not exist, is indicated). Otherwise, that apparent existence would exist apart from a vision.28
He then assumes, parallel to (2) that 
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It follows that in the visual awareness in question, we are not immediately aware of the mind-independent particular whiteness, and that its apparent existence would always be a mean between the whiteness and the visual act.
This version of the argument seems even stranger than the first, however. To begin with, it seems inappropriate to ask whether the apparent or objective existence of something is really the same as the mind-independent whiteness. For Ockham most frequently uses the terms "really the same" and "really distinct" in such a way that it makes sense to say only of real things (res) that really exist either that they are really the same or really distinct.29 It seems contrary to the spirit of the theory under attack to regard the apparent or objective existence of something as a real thing (res). For the whole point of such a theory is to distinguish a nonreal from a real mode of existence in such a way that the former is not reducible to the latter (see section IV below). Thus, the existence of a thing in a nonreal mode would not be something that occurs in the real mode, but rather in the nonreal mode of existence.
In this argument, Ockham seems to depart from his normal usage and, in effect, to allow that the apparent or objective existence of the whiteness really exists if and only if it is true that the whiteness has apparent existence. On this understanding, he correctly reasons that since it is logically possible that the whiteness should really exist when there is no visual awareness of it and hence when its apparent existence does not really exist and vice versa, the whiteness is not really the same as its apparent existence.
The difficulty is that this conclusion is doubly irrelevant to the issue at hand. For the theory under attack will be seen to compro- .36, q. 1 F) he maintains that even though creatures were possible things (res) from eternity, they were neither really the same as nor really distinct from the divine essence from eternity, because they did not really exist from eternity. Thus, he implies that "x is really distinct from y" is true at t only if both x and y exist at t. mise direct realism in epistemology only if it further endorses (1')-which neither Ockham's nor Aureoli's theory explicitly does. Second, where (1') is incorporated into the theory, the question about direct realism will be whether I can be immediately aware of the apparent or objective existence of the whiteness without also being immediately aware of the whiteness, not whether the whiteness can exist in reality without having apparent existence and vice versa. Direct realism will be threatened only if the answer to the first question is affirmative, just as the answer to the second is. But surely the answer to the first question is negative. For it seems impossible that I should have the apparent existence of this whiteness-as opposed to the apparent existence of some blackness or the notion of apparent existence in general-as an immediate object of my thought without simultaneously having this whiteness as an immediate object of my thought. If so, (1') and the supposed real distinction of whiteness and its apparent existence, are compatible with direct realism and Ockham's argument fails. Nevertheless, this does not settle the question of whether the objective-existence theory and direct realism are compatible. For we shall see that one way in which the objective-existence theory might be altered to meet the next objection involves giving up direct realism in epistemology.
III. The Objective-Existence Theory and Ontological Paradox
Ockham came to believe that paradoxical consequences follow from the general principles used in the objective-existence theory to infer the existence of something in a nonreal mode from the fact that someone thinks of or is aware of it. These alleged consequences are of the same sort as those raised for Anselm's and Descartes' ontological arguments by Gaunilo's perfect-island argument and Caterus's existent-lion objection. Ockham's argument occurs in his lengthy critique of Aureoli's theory; a summary of Aureoli's view will help us to appreciate the objection.
Aureoli bases his theory in the first instance on an argument from sensory illusion. 30 with a sense datum and others with a false proposition that appears true, Aureoli insists that it is the thing and its properties that appear. And if either or both do not really exist but are merely apparent, then they will have to have a nonreal mode of existence. He elaborates this reasoning in connection with eight examples of sensory illusion; but for present purposes it will be enough to consider two. (a) Someone is being carried along the water on a boat. The trees on the shore seem to that person to move. Nevertheless, Aureoli supposes, contrary to modern physics, the trees do not move. He apparently assumes (but does not explicitly state) a principle of the form P1. If x seems to be F, G, etc., then that instance of F-ness, Gness, etc. must be (in some sense). Substituting "in motion" for "F " and "motion" for "F-ness" and "the trees" for "x," he concludes that since the observed motion does not really exist in the air or in the act of vision, the motion must have some nonreal mode of existence, which he variously labels "intensional," "seen," or "adjudged" existence.3" (b) A stick is swung rapidly around in the air; a circle appears. Nevertheless, the circle will not be anything real in the stick, because the stick is straight. Nor is it anything real in the air. Nor can it be in the act of vision or in the eye, since the circle appears to be in the air, while the act of vision and the eye are not located there. Tacitly assuming a principle of the form P 2. If x appears to be F, G, etc., then x, having some sort of existence, is F, G, etc. and substituting "the circle" for "x" and "in the air" for "F," he concludes that the circle "that has intensional existence or that is in apparent, adjudged, or seen existence, is in the air.""2 Having argued that nonveridical acts of sense perception always posit something in a nonreal mode of existence, Aureoli extends this conclusion to veridical acts, acts of imagination, and acts of 'The trees appear to move; therefore some motion has objective existence' no more follows than 'The trees appear to move in reality; therefore, a real motion appears' follows. For the mode of arguing is analogous. But everyone agrees that the second inference does not hold good. Therefore, neither does the first. 3 Consider the principle instantiated by the first inference: P1'. If something x appears to be F, G, etc., then that instance of F-ness, G-ness, etc. has objective existence. Ockham says that (P 1') is equivalent to the principle employed in the second inference and it replaces (PI) once Aureoli's theory is extended to cover veridical as well as illusory acts of awareness. Ockham's point is that if (PI') held good for all substitutions for "F." "G." and "F-ness," "G-ness," then-substituting reallyy" for "F' and "real 0-ness" for "F-ness"-we could infer "Real 0-ness has objective existence" and hence "Some 0-ness is real" from "Something seems to be really 0" and thus produce 0-nesses in real existence simply by thinking of something as really 0 or by having something appear to be really 0-which is absurd. I think we can get clearer about the structure of Ockham's objection if we apply his reasoning to (P2) and its extension: P2'. If something x appears to be F, G, etc., then that thing x, having objective existence, is F, G, etc. Aureoli seems to reason that since the circle appears in the air, it has the property of being in the air and is not to be identified with anything, real or unreal, that lacks this property. In contemporary terms, it is as if Aureoli were operating with a system whose universe of discourse includes everything that exists either in reality or in a nonreal mode. Within this system, statements of the form "x is F " do not, in general, entail statements of the form "x exists in reality"; nor do they, in general, entail statements of the form "x has objective existence," although they do entail statements of the form "Either x exists in reality or x has objective existence." Given such a system, which allows items in the universe of discourse to exist in different modes, the way is open to relativize the predications to one mode of existence or the 34 Ord. I, d.27, q.3 K.
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other. This might be done by regarding such phrases as "in reality" and "in objective existence" as analogous to modal operators in having a single argument place satisfied by a proposition. Alternatively, one could construe "is in motion" and "is in the air," which appear to be one-place predicates, as two-place predicates, one of whose places is satisfied by a mode of existence. But it is clear from Aureoli's reasoning that he is not exercising either of these options. In Aureoli's system, the predications are not relativized to one mode of existence rather than the other, but rather attach absolutely. Thus, Aureoli says that the circle is in the air; he does not say that it is in the air in the mode of objective existence or that it is in the air in the mode of real existence. Aureoli's conclusion might be formalized in such a system as follows: (ax) (x is a circle & x is in the air & x has objective or apparent existence). "Is a circle" and "is in the air" and "has objective existence" all attach to "x" absolutely, not relative to a mode of existence. While statements of the form "x is F " do not in general entail statements of the form "x exists in reality" or "x has objective existence," such entailments will hold for some substitutions for "F." For instance, suppose that "really existent" or "objectively existent" or "really existent 0" or "objectively existent 0" is substituted for "F." Then we get entailments of real or objective existence, respectively. What Ockham has done, in effect, in dealing with (P1') is to understand "Real motion has objective existence" to be a statement formalizable in the abovedescribed system as "(3x) (x is motion & x is real & x has objective existence)"-which does, of course, entail that motion really exists. It is easy to see how a similar difficulty would follow from substituting "really nonexistent 0 for "F " in (P2) and (P2').
The latter paradoxical consequences might seem easily averted by simply disallowing "really existent," "really existent 0A" "really nonexistent," "really nonexistent s," and so forth, as legitimate substitutions for "F." However this move might otherwise fare, it would do nothing to obviate a more general difficulty which arises especially in connection with cases of sensory illusion in which a really existent particular is perceived to have properties that it does not really have. Reconsider the trees that appear to move but do not. From the latter clause, we can infer "These trees are not in motion." But (P2) entitles us to infer "These trees are in motion" from the fact that they appear to be in motion. Within the system Aureoli seems to be presupposing, both predications are made absolutely and not merely in relation to one or another mode of existence. Thus (P2), together with the assumption that something appears to have a property that it does not really have, entails a contradiction. Similarly, for (P2').
Although it is perhaps less obvious, the same general difficulty arises for (P1) and (P1'). Substituting "white dog" for "F' and "white caninity" for "F-ness" in (P1'), we derive "If something appears to be a white dog, then that particular white caninity has objective existence." Suppose that what appears to be a white dog is really a brown dog, so that the particular caninity that appears white is brown. Then, given that (P1') requires that the same caninity has objective existence and is white as has real existence, and is brown, if the predicates are not relativized to modes of existence, we shall have to conclude that the same particular caninity is both white and brown.
The trouble with these principles is that they all specify that the same particulars that appear to have certain properties are the ones that actually have those properties. If this stipulation is combined with the assumption that the predicates attach to their subjects absolutely and not merely in relation to a mode of existence, then sensory illusion becomes impossible, since it would involve the same particular in both having and lacking the same properties. And this difficulty will arise no matter what is substituted for "F," "G," and so forth, and hence cannot be removed by restricting permissible substitutions. Short of completely abandoning the theory that the particulars we are aware of or think of have a nonreal mode of existence, Aureoli could modify his theory in one of two obvious ways. First, he could retain the assumption that predication is not relativized to a mode of existence, but drop the specific requirement in (P 1), (P 1'), (P2), and (P2') that the same particulars that exist in reality and have certain properties, have objective or apparent existence and have certain other properties. For example, one could say that when the trees appear to move but do not, the trees that have objective existence and move are not the same particular trees as those 160 that really exist and do not move. If Aureoli modified his theory this way, however, it would fall prey to Ockham's earlier charge that it compromises a direct realist position in epistemology. If the objectively existent moving trees are not the same trees that really exist, then in such cases of sensory illusion, we are not immediately aware of the real trees.
Alternatively, Aureoli might retain the requirement that the same particulars that really exist and have certain properties, objectively exist and have certain other properties, while providing for predications to be relativized to modes of existence. This approach would involve replacing the above principles with P3. If something x appears to be F, G, etc., then in some mode of existence, x is F, G, etc. and its analogue P3'. If something x appears to be F, G, etc., then in the mode of objective existence, that thing x is F, G, etc. Here "in the mode of objective existence" functions as a sort of operator on the whole proposition and qualifies the predication by indicating that the predicate attaches to the subject in the mode of objective existence; similarly for "in reality." On this scheme, one can say without contradiction of the same particular trees that in reality the trees exist and are not moving, while in the mode of objective existence they exist and are moving. And one can thus account for sensory illusion without in any way compromising direct realism in epistemology. Similarly, the substitution of "really existent" and "really nonexistent" for "F' in these principles can be construed in a non-problematic way. For just as some things are real and others only imaginary, so some things are thought of as real and others are thought of as only imaginary. Thus, "In the mode of objective existence, x really exists" might be understood as logically equivalent to "In reality, someone thinks of x as really existent" and "In the mode of objective existence, x does not really exist" to "In reality, someone thinks of x as really non-existent." But the former does not entail "In reality, x exists" any more than the latter entails "In reality, x does not exist." It would not be necessary to stipulate that all predications within this system must be relativized. In fact, one would wish to 161 allow for some nonrelativized predications so that one might assert relations between things that exist in different modes. For the claim that objectively existent things are somehow similar to mind-independent particulars is crucial to Ockham's theory of natural signification. If Aureoli's theory could be rescued in either of these ways, the application of Ockham's objective-existence theory to our awareness or thoughts of particulars could be saved as well. But it is clear that Ockham would reject the first way. And it is equally obvious from his works that he completely overlooks the second way of removing apparent contradictions. For example, in arguing that genera and species cannot be real things, Ockham repeatedly insists that "universal" and "particular" are contradictory properties, and that everything that really exists is particular. He concludes that theories which say that anything that really exists is universal will end in contradiction. A number of his opponents reply that they do not simply assert that some real thing is particular and the same real thing is universal. Rather they say that a real thing of itself is universal and the same real thing signed in this suppositum is particular; or alternatively, that a real thing according to its actual existence is particular, and the same real thing according to its existence in the intellect is universal; or again that the same real thing is universal under one concept and particular under another concept. 35 In responding, however, Ockham assumes that the only way such inserted phrases could remove the contradiction is by functioning to alter what the subject terms stand for, so that it turns out that genuine contradictories are not really asserted of one and the same property-bearer. And he considers himself to have refuted their positions when he has argued that the above-mentioned phrases cannot function in that way.36 But it is quite clear, even from the wording of these positions, that the above-mentioned phrases were not supposed to alter what the subject term stands for, but rather to relativize the predications.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Ockham came to regard these difficulties, together with the others that he brings against Aureoli, Ockham emphasizes that "from eternity a thing is an idea, but it is not actually existing from eternity."39 Indeed, since objective existence is mind-dependent existence, the ideas depend for their necessary objective existence on the divine act of thought. By the time he wrote Quodlibeta IV, q. 19, however, Ockham had come to see (1) as asserting that nothing other than God has necessary existence of any kind-real or unreal. And given that understanding, he argues that (1) is incompatible with his application of the objective-existence theory to God's thought: understanding other things, God would understand suchficta. Thus, from eternity, there was a whole coordination of as manyficta as there can be different intelligible things, whose existence was so necessary that God could not destroy them, which seems false.40
Once again, the argument misrepresents Ockham's objectiveexistence theory, if the termficta is understood the way Ockham originally took it: namely, as standing only for those objectively existent entities that cannot exist in reality (see section I above). 
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For Ockham did not originally claim that when God understands other things, the immediate object of His thought is invariably a fictum. It is when He understands genera and species.41 But when He understands possible creatures, the immediate object of His thought is those creatures themselves insofar as they exist objectively in Him. Nevertheless, the above passage poses a genuine problem for the objective-existence theory, because that theory does imply that an infinite coordination has objective existence necessarily and eternally. God as essentially omniscient will no more be able to bring it about that the objects of His thought do not have objective existence, than He will be able to alter His own nature. Thus, even if their objective existence is dependent upon God's thought, it is independent of His will-which Ockham had come to regard as theologically unacceptable.
Someone who understood (1) the second way would have good theological reason to abandon the objective-existence theory. But this does not mean he would have a motive for putting the mental-act theory in its place. On the mental-act theory, a thought of particulars is of those particulars it naturally signifies. What, then, makes the divine cognition to be a thought of each and every possible particular? Briefly, according to the only criterion Ockham provides for the mental-act theory, an act of thought is proper to a particular if and only if that particular meets the following two conditions: (a) it is one of the actual or possible things that the act of thought resembles most; and (b) of those things that meet condition (a), the act of thought is apt to be caused by that particular and not by others.42 Presumably, the divine thought 41 In Ord. I, d.35, q.5 R, Ockham says that "where the things to be made by Him are concerned, God has a cognition not only of universals the way a created artisan does of things to be made by him, but also a distinct and particular cognition of any particular to be made...."
It follows that God conceives of both universals and particulars.
4 In Quodlibeta I, q. 13, the following objection is raised: "First, it seems that an intuitive cognition is not proper, since any intuitive cognition is granted to be equally similar to one particular as to another . . . " Ockham replies, "I say, therefore, to the first of these that an intuitive cognition is a proper cognition of a particular, not because it is more similar to one than to another, but because it is naturally caused by one and not by the other, nor can it be caused by the other. If you say that it can be caused by God alone-it is true. But such a vision is always apt to be caused by one created object and not by the other." Compare Rep. II, q. 15, EE, quoted in note 21 above. together with the divine essence is common to the three persons [and] is altogether uncausable, indeed even altogether unproducible. Consequently, the divine intellect is not changeable at all-indeed to change is altogether inconsistent with it, just as to be brought about or to be caused by anything is incompatible with the divine cognition." 166 available within Ockham's logic: for Ockham, we may say, a theory has an ontological commitment to entities of a certain sort, if, in order for the theory to be true, a term must be taken to supposit or stand for such entities in a proposition included in the theory.45 (A) Ontological Commitments ofthe Objective Existence Theory: By this criterion, Ockham clearly thought that the objective-existence theory had an ontological commitment to both real and objectively existent entities. It has an ontological commitment to real entities, since "A man is an animal" cannot be true unless both the term "man" and the term "animal" supposit or stand for really existent particular men; to objectively existent entities, since the proposition "Man is a species" cannot be true, unless both the term "man" and the term "species" supposit or stand for the objectively existent universal man.
Nevertheless, a philosopher might make use of a theory that had an ontological commitment to entities in the sense just explained, while holding the metaphysical belief that they are reducible to something else. For instance, a phenomenalist might make use of a system in which terms are taken to stand in a proposition for physical objects, even though he holds the metaphysical belief that physical objects are ultimately reducible to perceptions or sense data. And he might or might not hold that it is in principle possible to formulate a language whose terms can stand 4 For Ockham, supposition is a property of terms, but unlike signification, a property that terms have only insofar as they occur in propositions. In the Summa Logicae I, ch. 63, he explains: "Moreover, 'suppositon' means, as it were, being posited in the place of something else. Thus, when a term stands for something else in a proposition, in such a way that we use that term in place of something of which, or of a pronoun indicating which the term (or the nominative case of that term, if it is in an oblique case) is verified, the term supposits for that thing." (Boehner, GAl, and Brown edition, p. 193). For instance, "man" supposits for Gerald Ford in "Every man is an animal" because the proposition "This is a man" (where "this" indicates Gerald Ford) is true. The term "man") has personal supposition when it stands in a proposition for one of the things it signifies (as in the previous example); material supposition, when it stands for the spoken sound or written inscription "man"; and simple supposition, when it stands for the concept "man. Although Ockham did not explicitly address himself to this issue, I think it is fairly clear that the answer is negative. In my opinion, the only reduction it would be plausible to see him envisioning is one that identifies the objective existence of a thing with the real existence of a mental act with a certain content. After all, he does appear to think that a statement of the form "x has objective existence" entails and is entailed by the statement that a mental act with a certain content really exists. But any attempt to make this reduction by identifying the immediate object of thought with an act of intellect of a certain content, would have been rejected by Ockham. For in arguing for the objective-existence theory against the mental-act theory, he maintains that every act of understanding must have an objecteven when it is a thought of a universal that cannot really existsince otherwise the thought would be a thought of nothing. But he says that the object of thought cannot be identified with the act of intellect, because then the act of intellect would be an act of understanding itself-which he finds absurd.46 And if he had originally envisioned any other sort of reduction of objectively existent entities to acts of intellect with certain contents, it seems that fairness to the mental-act theory would have required him to bring it up at this point. Further, as we have just seen, Ockham worries that the objective-existence theory, together with the doctrine of divine omniscience, posits a whole coordination of entities that have objective existence eternally and necessarily and independently of the divine will. But if the objective existence of creatures from eternity were reducible to the real existence from eternity of the divine act of thought, it would not be necessary to suppose that anything other than the divine essence exists eternally and independently of the divine will. That Ockham abandoned the objective-existence theory in part because of this objection, is evidence that he did not envisage such a reduction. If we think of something, then it has some sort of existence-namely, either real existence or objective existence, objectively existent entities are needed, because we sometimes think of things as having properties that no real things can and/or do have. Further, once the theory is extended to cover thoughts of things that do exist, it is claimed that it is the fact that an act of intellect is directed to an objectively existent entity and to this one rather than that one, which accounts for the fact that it is a thought of something and of this rather than that.
Chatton argues that objectively existent entities are superfluous because they cannot possibly fill the latter theoretical role, while the real things posited by the theory can do so, unassisted by such objectively existent entities. To begin with, he contends that "there is no apparent contradiction in an act of intellect's remaining in existence without any suchfictum."50 Chatton bases this claim on the assumption that if the real existence of an act of intellect is logically independent of every other really existent thing, then a fortiori it must be logically independent of the objective existence of anything. His second premise is that "it is a Ga1's ed., p. 202, lin. 21-2. contradiction to suppose that there is an act of intellect unless something-say its term-is understood."''5 Necessarily, every act of thought has an object. If it is not necessary that an act of thought is directed towards some objectively existent entity (as it cannot be if it is not necessary that some entity have objective existence whenever an act of thought exists), then that the thought is directed towards the objectively existent entity and towards one rather than another, cannot be what accounts for its being a thought of something and of this rather than that. Some alternative explanation must be found.
A devotee of the objective-existence theory would no doubt accept Chatton's second premise and use the objective-existence theory's analysis of thought to argue that his first premise is false. By the time Ockham wrote the Quodlibeta, however, he had come to endorse Chatton's argument as his own.
Chatton thinks that an adequate analysis of what happens when we think of something can be given in terms of the really existent things admitted by the theory. If we think of a round square or a chimera, it is not necessary that there be (in some sense) anything that is a round square or a chimera. It is enough if a really existing thing has a different property-namely, the property of being-of-a-round-square or the property of being-of-a-chimera. Thus, Chatton writes, The mind can imagine fingerr) many things, such as a golden mountain, a chimera, etc. But this is nothing other than for it to have an act of understanding by virtue of which I could judge that its nature would be of this sort if it existed, as was said above.52 Such properties are no doubt to be identified with those real features of mental acts that Meinong labelled "contents" and that Ockham acknowledges even on the objective-existence theory. And Chatton wants to say that it is just such features that make thoughts to be of one thing rather than another. Ockham accepts Chatton's conclusion and-abandoning the distinction between objective and real existence-identifies concepts with really existent acts of intellect.
A full evaluation of Chatton's contention that the mental-act Nevertheless, Ockham does not restrict himself to such a sparse ontology when doing modal logic. For throughout the Summa Logicae, his principal work on logic, he assumes that concepts are mental qualities and not objectively existent entities. But he explicitly retains the claim that terms can supposit or stand for possibles in a proposition, whether or not the possibles actually exist. Specifically, he lays down the rule that in a present tense proposition, a term can supposit only for things that really exist at the present time; in a past tense proposition for those that exist now or for those that existed in the past; in a future tense proposition, for those that exist now or for those that will exist; and in a proposition of possibility, for those that exist now or for those that can exist."4 By the above definition, it follows that Ockham retained an ontological commitment to unactualized possibles even after he gave up the objective-existence theory.
If so, however, we must ask whether the mental-act theory can account for the ontological status of unactualized possibles as well as the objective-existence theory can. 
